In takeover bids for unlisted firms, the typically more closely knit target shareholders have the bargaining power and incentive to force the bidder's managers to disclose their private information about the value of their firm's shares. The acceptance of share-based offers by private target shareholders thus conveys favourable information about the net present value of the takeover, unlike the case in share based bids for listed targets. We document that successful bids for private targets are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns to bidders over the announcement period, a result that diverges from findings based on bids for public targets. Contrary to Chang (1998), share based bids for Australian private targets are not associated with higher abnormal returns to bidders. However, most bids by listed companies for private companies are cash based and these generate a positive return. Our results are consistent with the explanation that lower competition for private targets allows acquirers to capture more of the economic rent from takeovers by offering cash bids.
Introduction
The overwhelming majority, by value and number, of takeover bids are for nonexchange listed targets, yet most studies on the economic consequences of takeovers have focused on bids where the target firm is listed (ie, public bids). The narrow focus is explained in part by data for listed firms being more readily available and by the greater prominence of public bids. Nevertheless, theories developed to explain public bids do not necessarily apply to bids for non-listed firms (ie, private bids). For instance, Chang (1998) points out that the signalling implications of the method of payment are likely to differ across bids for private and public targets.
Share bids for public targets are affected by adverse selection. Outsider investors may believe that managers with private information about their firm's shares offer them as consideration only when they are overvalued (Leland and Pyle 1977, Myers and Majluf 1984) . Support for this proposition comes from the impressive body of evidence that shows cash bids for public targets earn bidders higher returns than do share bids. In private bids, the typically more closely knit target shareholders have the bargaining power and incentive to force the bidder's managers to disclose their private information about the value of their firm's shares. The target shareholders' willingness to accept shares thus conveys favourable information about the bidding firm. In line with this implication, Chang (1998) finds share-based offers are associated with significantly higher announcement period returns in private bids by US listed firms.
The validity of Chang's findings for other markets is a moot point. The US equity market is highly competitive. Chang notes cash bids for unlisted targets may generate positive abnormal returns if limited competition allows bidders to identify undervalued targets. Bidder returns could also be positive in cash bids if acquisition creates synergy gains that are bidder-specific. Again, bidder-specific synergy gains are more likely in markets with fewer firms.
We replicate and extend Chang's analysis using Australian equity market data. In extending his analysis, we investigate whether there is a difference in sharemarket reaction to private bids if the unlisted target's shareholders/directors are appointed to the merged entity's board or if the target firm's upper echelon managers remain in charge. We also gauge the plausibility of the explanation that bidder-specific synergy gains are responsible for positive sharemarket reaction by reviewing the association between abnormal return and the extent the bidder and target are in related industries. 3 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 begins with a brief survey of the evidence on the wealth effects of takeover offers over the announcement period and the impact of partitioning samples by method of payment. The testable implications for private takeovers are then discussed. Research method and data are described in Section 3 and Section 4 comprises a review of results. Finally in Section 5 conclusions and future research directions are discussed.
2.0
Evidence on method of payment and implications for private takeovers
Method of payment and returns to bidder firms
In their widely cited survey of the sharemarket consequences of takeover bids, Jensen and Ruback (1983) review the evidence on returns to acquiring firms over the immediate bid announcement period and draw the conclusion that "bidding firms'
shareholders do not lose [from takeovers]" (p.47) 1 . Subsequent studies document considerable divergence in announcement period returns that is systematically associated with method of payment, as predicted by Carleton, Guilkey, Harris and Stewart (1983) .
Travlos (1987) , for instance, finds that 60 acquiring firms that made share-based bids earned a significant average cumulative return (CAR) of minus 1.47% over the period [-2,0] days relative to the bid announcement date while 100 cash-based bidders experienced insignificant returns. Bellamy and Lewin (1992) obtain similar results when reviewing returns to Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed acquiring firms.
On the bid announcement day, bidders involved in 52 share offers earned a significantly negative abnormal return of 2.25% while bidders in 81 cash offers earned an insignificant return of 0.03% 2 .
The evidence on method of payment is not entirely consistent. Bugeja and Walter (1995) find that Australian bidders that offer shares (cash) earn significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns over the period [-60 ,+1] days 3 . However, when they measure returns over the same event-window as Bellamy and Lewin, they find significant positive abnormal returns for cash bidders but all other results are qualitatively unchanged. More curiously, Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) find that 1 Other studies track long-term returns to acquiring firms and find evidence of under-performance.
However, in a study of Australian takeovers, Brown and da Silva Rosa (1998) show that the purported evidence of long-run under-performance by acquiring firms is not robust to likely sources of bias. 2 The performance of the cash bidders improved in days [+1] and [+2] when they earned significantly positive abnormal returns of 1.3% and 0.56% respectively. 3 Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) report a similar result for US acquirers.
method of payment predicts announcement period abnormal returns in the US but not in the UK.
Notwithstanding Franks et. al's (1988) results 4 , the import of the early method of payment findings is that cash bids convey positive information about the value of the acquisition in the eyes of the acquirer while investors evidently interpret share bids as a signal that acquirers consider their shares over-valued. Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) add more structure to the theory by pointing out that the information content implicit in the method of payment is likely to be affected by the ownership structure of bidding firms. They note that managers of bidding firms who own a controlling shareholding run the risk of losing control when they make share based takeover offers. Investors recognise this and the offer of shares by these managers signals to investors that the acquisition is at least not value-decreasing because owners will not dilute their holdings for a negative NPV project.
Interestingly, the evidence on the influence of ownership structure on the signalling properties of method of payment is mixed. Amihud et al (1990) find evidence consistent with the above argument. However, Blackburn, Dark and Hanson (1997) expand the definition of owner-controlled firms to include all firms with large shareholders and find divergent results. In line with Amihud et al, they document that manager-controlled (but not owned) firms making share offers earn significantly negative returns but, contrary to Amihud et al, that owner-controlled firms making share based bids also earn significantly negative returns. Blackburn et al conclude that "apparently, the negative signal implied in the stock exchange for owner-controlled firms is not sufficiently attenuated by the knowledge that owners are unlikely to risk diluting or losing their control over a non-beneficial investment opportunity" (p. 585).
If the premise that investors take into account ownership structure when assessing the information content of method of payment is at all valid, we may expect it to be particularly relevant in the case of private takeovers. Private companies are typically controlled by a large shareholder who participates closely in management (La Porta, Lopez, de Silanes & Shleifer, 1999) . The private knowledge of the target's value held by the large shareholder intensifies the "double lemons" problem first noted by Hansen (1987) . Bidders do not offer shares when they believe their shares are 4 One possible reason for Franks et al's atypical UK results is that their announcement date may be inaccurate for many of their sample firms. It is the earliest of (a) the date the London Stock Exchange is informed, (b) the date of the first merger offer, (c) the date the acquirer acquires sufficient shares to achieve control, and (d) the last date for which monthly return data are available for the target. In contrast, the US announcement date is defined as the first mention of an acquisition in the Wall Street Journal Index.
undervalued and targets only accept cash when their private assessment of their own share value is less than the offer.
One way to avoid the "double lemons" impasse is through the exchange of information among bidders and targets that reduces their joint information asymmetry. Importantly, the controlling stake held by the large shareholders in the private target makes them well placed to receive and evaluate information on the value of the proposed merger. Since they have more concentrated holdings, the shareholders in private targets have lower costs in coordinating their negotiation with the bidder firm. Their in-depth firm knowledge also better places them to evaluate the merits of a proposed merger. All this implies that if the target shareholders accept shares then outside investors will interpret this as a credible signal that the deal is expected to create value (Chang, 1998) or, more weakly, that the bidder's shares are not overvalued. We note that the credibility of the value of bids in which shares are offered as consideration is enhanced if the target firms' upper echelon managers accept positions in the merged entity. In this case, they are committing their human capital as well as their financial capital.
Competition for corporate control and bidder returns
The preceding analysis implies that the information content of the method of payment is different in public and private takeovers. However, it is likely that the level of competition in the market for corporate control is lower for private targets and this can also be expected to affect acquiring firms' returns from takeovers.
Firms that acquire public targets may earn unimpressive returns because the market for corporate control of public companies is highly competitive. Poulsen (1987), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) , Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) and Schwert (1996) test this hypothesis by reviewing announcement returns over various periods of time. All four studies document that the growth in auction-style takeover contests has been accompanied by decreasing returns over time to acquiring firms.
Auction-like contests are more likely to attract entrants when more is known about the target. In this respect, it is pertinent that privately held firms are not obliged to release value relevant information to the public. On the other hand, ASX-listed firms are obliged to release any price sensitive information they hold. The higher cost of obtaining information on privately held firms is thus likely to be associated with higher returns to acquiring firms since they can now capture a greater proportion of the expected gains, particularly if there are only a few firms with whom the target may reap synergistic gains.
Summary
A majority of studies find that announcement period returns to firms making cash bids are higher than the returns to firms that initiate share based bids. The favourable signalling implication of cash bids is the widely accepted explanation. Chang (1998) posits that the more cohesive shareholders of private targets have the incentive and relative bargaining power to extract more information from acquirers so that the acceptance of share based offers will be interpreted by outside investors as a credible indication that the acquisition has a positive NPV or, at least, as a credible indication that the bidders' shares are not over-valued, thereby cancelling the negative signal from an equity issue. In this case, the acquirer should earn higher returns when it makes a successful share based offer for a private target. However, the level of competition in the takeovers market is a confounding factor. The returns to acquirers that offer cash may be higher if cash bids allow the acquirer to capture more of the economic rent arising from lack of competition in the market for corporate control.
The relative validity of each explanation is tested using the method described in Section 3.
Research method and data

Research method
In brief, we test whether the signalling implications of the method of payment in takeovers of private and public companies are different by comparing the share market reaction to cash and share bids made by listed companies for, respectively, private and public (ie, ASX listed) companies.
In common with similar event studies, we review share market reaction on announcement of a takeover bid. However, Asquith (1983) and Malatesta and Thompson (1985) , among others, note that reviewing abnormal share price performance only around the bid announcement period will not capture all relevant reaction, in part because the outcomes of takeover offers are usually not confirmed for some considerable time after the bid announcement date. Following Limmack (1991) , the problem is addressed by reviewing abnormal performance over eight eventperiods, ranging from a period prior to the announcement date to a period after the outcome is confirmed, ie, the effective date. The eight periods are depicted graphically in Figure 1 . Each period is expressed in trading days, relative to either the bid announcement date or the date the outcome of the bid was confirmed, i.e., the effective date. Interestingly, despite the ASX requiring an announcement if "substantial" takeover negotiations take place, the first announcement is issued at the effective date for 83 out of the 144 offers for the private targets. The average time between the announcement date and the effective date is 26 days while the median is zero (see 5 The possible signalling implications are discussed more fully in section 4. Table 1 ). Given that extensive discussions typically take place between acquirer and target before completion of a deal and that news of these frequently leak to the public, there is a high probability that the average abnormal returns over the announcement period represent an underestimate of the share market impact of the deal. We return to this point later. We also note that only four of the 144 takeover offers are unsuccessful (ie, do not lead to an acquisition) which rules out a meaningful comparison of the difference in returns between successful and unsuccessful offers for private firms. The subsequent analysis is therefore restricted to the 140 cases where the takeover bid is successful (henceforth, private takeovers). and 29 that did not. We review just the 78 "successful" acquisitions, given that there are only four bid announcements for private targets that are "unsuccessful". Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
Consistent with Chang (1998) , the median transaction value for private takeovers of $4.35m is significantly lower than the $18.50m for public takeovers. Table 1 also shows that the relative size of the bid (transaction value divided by market capitalisation of the bidder one month before the announcement date) is significantly lower in private takeovers. The lead time is significantly longer in public takeovers.
Descriptive statistics on the method of payment employed in our samples of takeovers are presented in Table 2 . Bids are partitioned into three categories, cash, stock, and mixed 8 . Cash offers include non-convertible debt exchanges, stock offers include shares and convertible notes, and mixed offers are the ones that are not either cash or stock offers. The available data do not allow identification of the respective portions financed by cash and stock in mixed offers.
Table 2 about here
There is a significant difference in the method of payment across private and public bids (χ 2 = 26.8, df = 2, p<.001). The majority of private bids are financed by cash while stock and mixed bids predominate in public bids. This finding diverges from Chang (1998) who finds that stock and mixed offers comprise the majority of takeover bids for both private and public targets, although the margin is smaller in the case of private bids. We return to discuss the implications of the Australian findings when reviewing the announcement period returns.
If, as we predict, the medium of exchange is informative in private takeovers, then it should also follow that the credibility of the "news" being conveyed will vary with certain characteristics of the takeover. The characteristics we follow are whether the target firms' shareholders become substantial shareholders in the merged entity, the extent to which the bidder and target are in related industries, whether target directors are appointed to the board of the merged entity, and finally whether upper echelon target managers remain in equivalent positions. Descriptive statistics that indicate the distribution of the above characteristics in our experimental samples are presented in Table 3 .
Table 3 about here
Consistent with Chang (1998), a blockholder is defined as a beneficial shareholder of 5 percent shareholding or greater of the bidder's outstanding shares at or after the completion of takeovers. Company announcements made at the time of bid announcement and at the completion dates as well as annual reports are used to identify creation of blockholders. Table 3 shows that, when only stock and mixed bids are reviewed, a blockholder emerged in 38% (or 19 out of 50) cases. This proportion is slightly higher than the one reported by Chang (1998) . However, it is worth noting that in about half of all share based offers the total consideration amounts to less than five percent of the bidder's outstanding shares, ie, less than the amount required to become a blockholder. Not surprisingly, significantly more blockholders emerge in pure stock offers relative to mixed offers (χ 2 = 9.4, df = 1, p<.01)
To determine the relatedness of business between a bidder and target, we compare the bidders' and targets' primary two-digit SIC codes, as recorded in SDC Platinum.
Bidders and targets are classified as being in a related industry if they have a common two-digit SIC code 9 . Table 3 shows about 50 percent of the acquisitions of privately held and unlisted targets are in related business. Interestingly, if being in a related industry lowers information asymmetry this does not appear to affect the method of payment. Knowing if the target is in related industry is not informative about the method of payment (χ 2 = 0.9, df = 2, p=.657).
Information on the appointment of a target firm's director to the board of the merged entity is obtained from company announcements. Table 3 shows that in only 26 out of 140 takeovers are shareholders/directors appointed to the bidder's board of directors.
As expected, these appointments are more likely if a share offer was made (χ 2 = 18.67, df = 2, p<.001). In 44 out of 140 takeovers, the pre-bid managers continued in their positions but is not statistically related to the method of payment (χ 2 = 0.34, df = 2, p=.84). 9 A common director between the bidder and target is another potential proxy for relatedness. However, this occurred in only one transaction in our sample. 10 In the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 bidding firms do not experience significantly positive excess returns when takeover bids are announced.
Results
Excess returns to bidders in public and private takeovers
Table 4 about here
The announcement period result for the private takeovers is remarkable for two reasons. One is that the strong positive returns on announcement of bids for private targets suggest that the market does not appear to have anticipated the bids, despite the first formal notification of a bid by the acquirer being made at the effective date in the majority of cases. The other reason the higher return on news of bids for private targets is remarkable is that the relative values of the bids are, as seen in Table 1, generally much lower than the bids for public targets. Other things being equal, the smaller bids may be expected to have less impact on the equity value of the acquiring firms.
A potential explanation for the difference in announcement period returns to bidders in public and private takeovers is that investors anticipate public takeovers prior to the official announcement. However, the excess returns to acquiring firms over the period [-50AD, -1AD] are not significantly different for public and private takeovers. If
anything, it appears that private takeovers are more likely to be anticipated. The acquirers involved in private takeovers which had return data available earn a mean excess return of 5.57% (Z-value = 1.84) while the acquirers in public takeovers earn a mean return over the same pre-announcement period of 1.55% (Z-value = 1.55).
In sum, the returns to acquiring firms from public takeovers are disappointing when compared with their returns from private takeovers. The reasons for this are unclear but the strongly positive returns from private takeovers indicate that measurement issues are unlikely to be the explanation. The excess returns in public and private takeovers are calculated the same way. Our results reinforce the anomalous nature of the announcement period excess returns to acquiring firms in public takeovers. Table 5 documents market excess returns in private takeovers, after partitioning the sample firms on the basis of method of payment 13 . The results diverge sharply from those reported by Chang (1998) . Over the immediate bid announcement period [-2AD, +2AD], acquiring firms which offered cash earn a significantly positive (at the 0.001 13 The results for 'equity' and 'mixed' are combined since the same results are obtained if the two groups are treated separately. The results for private bidders only are discussed here since the results for public bidders do not differ (see footnote 14).
Method of payment and excess returns
level) mean (median) excess return of 3.26% (2.14%), while bidders whose offers included a share component earn an insignificant mean (median) excess return of 1.65% (1.77%).
Table 5 about here
The announcement period returns do not support the hypothesis that successful share based bids for private targets are interpreted by investors as a credible sign that the takeover is expected to be a positive NPV investment. However, given that the usual market reaction to equity-based financing is unfavourable, the non-negative market response may manifest because investors in Australia interpret share bids for private targets as a credible signal that bidders' shares are not over-valued (ie, the negative implication of a share issue is counter-balanced by the positive news that the shareholders in the private target accept the shares). Nevertheless, the insignificant returns to share offerers remains puzzling given the US based results reported by
Chang. Note that the strongly positive returns to bidders that offered cash are consistent with the alternative hypothesis that these bidders identify undervalued targets in the less competitive unlisted sector and capture the gains for their shareholders by offering cash. If undervalued targets are available, it may be that share based offers signal that the target is not undervalued in the bidder's eyes and this news may disappoint the market, which could explain why the bid does not generate significantly positive abnormal returns. Undervaluation and the consequent disappointment at the news that a bid for a private target is share based rather than cash based is more likely in a less competitive market. This may explain the difference between our results and those reported by Chang (1998) .
The sharemarket consequences associated with the signalling implications of method of payment are likely to be most apparent around the bid announcement since that is when the information becomes public. However, Table 5 shows that bidding firms that made cash offers achieved significantly positive abnormal returns of 7.01% on average over the pre-bid announcement period, . In contrast, firms that made pure equity or mixed share and cash bids earned insignificant returns over the immediate pre-bid period. The hypotheses investigated in this paper do not predict this finding but we may note that the result is inconsistent with the view that firms take advantage of periods of exceptional share price increases by making share-based takeover offers; our results do not suggest that bidders which make share-based offers exhibit higher pre-bid performance relative to other bidders. captures the effect of the news that the bid will prove successful in terms of leading to acquisition of the target, the result for the cash bidders reinforces the view that the market considers cash bids as value-increasing, on average. In this context, it is surprising that the resolution of uncertainty when share based bids are made does not generate a comparable significant upward revision in the return to bidding companies.
If share based bids are more difficult to value, we might expect that the resolution of uncertainty when they are made is more "newsworthy" than the resolution of uncertainty associated with cash-bids.
In light of the insignificant returns earned by share bidders around various subperiods, measured relative to the bid announcement date and prior to the effective date, it is surprising to see from Table 5 that over the period [-10AD, +10ED] share bidders earn a mean (median) return of 6.35% (6.86%) which is significant at the five per cent level using a two-tailed test. Further, both the mean and median returns to the share based bidders are higher than the corresponding returns to the cash based bids. Note that returns over the period [-10AD, +10ED] may be expected to provide a more complete assessment of investors' response to news of a takeover offer since this period incorporates both the announcement date and the effective date. A possible explanation for the insignificant returns to share bidder observed in periods that incorporate just the announcement date or the outcome/effective date is that although the market views share based bids positively, the upward revision in share price is not strong enough to be significant over short event-windows that do not incorporate all relevant information about the bid. The statistics in Table 5 periods, positive abnormal returns outnumbered negative abnormal returns indicating that bids for private targets are mostly seen as "good news" by the market.
In closing this review of the impact of method of payment, we note that, although our results for private takeovers diverge from those reported by Chang (1998) at least around the bid announcement period, the difference in mean excess returns to bidders that make, respectively, cash and shares offers does seem connected with the fact that these are private takeovers. The insignificant returns, before controlling for method of payment, around the immediate bid announcement date (see Table 4 ) to bidders for public targets are consistent with those reported by Da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinbeck and Walter (2000) . Over the bid announcement period excess returns were not empirically associated with the proposed medium of exchange consistent with part of the results reported by Bugeja and Walter (1995) but inconsistent with Bellamy and Lewin (1992) 14 .
The interaction of method of payment with other takeover characteristics
Given that the medium of exchange is informative in private takeovers, we may expect that the credibility of the "news" being conveyed will vary with certain characteristics of the takeover. For instance, Chang (1998) posits that outside investors are likely to view a takeover more favourably when acceptance of a share offer in a private takeover leads to the creation of a substantial shareholder (ie, blockholder). His rationale is that blockholders are more likely to monitor managers closely and therefore reduce agency costs and their acceptance of a substantial holding of shares provides a credible signal that they believe the takeover will be valueincreasing. In line with his prediction, Chang finds that the average excess return to acquirers when a new blockholder emerges from the merger of the target and bidder is 4.96% and just 1.77% when no blockholder emerges 15 . The difference is significant at the one percent level.
We also incorporate a blockholder variable in our analysis but suggest other factors that the market is also likely to take into account when evaluating the prospects of success for a takeover. We posit that takeovers of private companies that operate in industries closely related to their acquirers are viewed positively by the market because synergy benefits and/or economies of scale are more likely to be realised and the level of information asymmetry between acquirer and target is likely to be lower, which means that the target shareholders are more likely to be accurate in their assessment of the value of the takeover. In similar vein, the appointment of a target's director to the board of the merged entity also signals to the market that the merger has taken place between two more or less equally informed parties who both expect the takeover to yield value and who are committed to its success. The continued appointment of the targets' upper echelon managers to similar positions is also 14 Median excess returns for public cash bidders in the announcement period were -0.33% (Z=0.57, p=0.569) while equity and mixed bidders earned a median excess return of 0.66% (Z=0.73, p=0.467). Similar insignificant results were obtained for the other periods examined.
15 Chang (1998) also reports that the median excess return when a blockholder emerges is 4.6% and 0.60 % in takeovers when a blockholder does not emerge.
expected to be interpreted as a positive sign that valuable firm-specific knowledge will not be lost.
The results in Table 6 show that only two of the four factors that we posit are relevant when evaluating the likelihood that a takeover will be a positive NPV investment are statistically significant predictors of sharemarket reaction. Our results diverge from Chang (1998) in that creation of a blockholder is not associated with statistically significant higher positive abnormal returns. However, over the extended event-period [-10AD,+10AD] the mean additional abnormal return of 6.06% to bidders making offers in which a blockholder is created verge on being significant at the 10% level 16 .
The results over the extended event-period merit particular attention because news of creation of a blockholder will generally only be known or confirmed some considerable time after the announcement and confirmation of a successful offer.
Appointment of the target directors to the board of the merged entity is not associated with a significantly different abnormal return over the immediate bid announcement period +2AD] . However, if news of the appointment of the target directors to the board of the merged entity is unknown at the time of the takeover announcement, the insignificant result over the immediate bid announcement period is not surprising.
The market is likely to know of the appointment of the directors by the effective date and Table 6 shows there is a statistically significant negative association (at the 1% level) between appointment of a target director to the merged entity's board and excess return over the period +2ED] . The association is in the opposite direction to that predicted, but note that over the extended period +10ED] there is a statistically significant positive association (at the 5% level) between appointment of a target director and excess return to the acquirer.
The divergent abnormal returns across different event-periods associated with appointment of the target's directors to the board of the merged entity are a puzzle, prima facie. A potential explanation for the significantly negative association around the effective date is that investors interpret appointment of the target's directors as a signal that the extensive reorganisation necessary to capture the gains from the merger are less likely to take place. However, it is difficult to reconcile this finding with the significantly positive association between return and board appointment over the extend period, +10ED] . The lack of a significant association between retention of target management and abnormal return to bidders over any eventwindow also does not support the hypothesis that investors consider retention of target management as a barrier to capturing gains from takeover. However, given that it is likely that news of whether target management is retained only emerges well after the effective date, it may be that our event-windows do not capture this effect. We leave resolution of these results for future research Table 6 also indicates that firms earn a higher return when their target is unrelated.
The difference is statistically significant (at the 5% level) over the immediate period before the effective date, , and the overall period, +10ED] .
Leaving aside the reason for the significant difference, it is surprising that it does not manifest in a statistically significant way over the immediate bid announcement period, when the degree of industry relatedness among the firms is known. In any event, the results do not support the hypothesis that bids for unrelated companies are less value-increasing for firms that acquire private companies. Our results suggest the reverse. In summary, bidding firms exhibit statistically significant positive excess returns on announcement of takeover bids for unlisted companies. This result stands in contrast with the typically insignificant returns to acquirers on announcement of bids for listed firms, which are usually much larger than unlisted firms. Australian listed acquirers tend to make cash offers rather than share offers when bidding for unlisted targets, unlike their US counterparts. Furthermore, the positive returns to acquirers in private bids are driven by the cash-based offers, a result that diverges from that reported by Chang (1998) . We conclude that these results are more consistent with the explanation that the Australian market for private takeovers is less competitive than the market for corporate control among listed entities, than with any other explanation. The lack of competition yields economic rent to acquirers who maximise returns to their shareholders by offering cash rather than shares. The extent to which bidders and targets are in related industries, and the appointment of target directors to the board of the merged entity do appear to be significantly informative to sharemarket investors but in a direction contrary to that expected. 
